Freshfields Asia-Pacific International Arbitration Update: Developments in the Indian Supreme Court and Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC)

I. Can Indian Courts Modify Arbitral Awards? A Closer Look at the Gayatri Balasamy Decision

It is well established that courts have the power to set aside arbitral awards or remit them to tribunals for reconsideration. But can courts modify arbitral awards? In Gayatri Balasamy v M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd [2025] INSC 605, the Indian Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, held that an Indian court hearing a set-aside application has additional power under the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (ACA) to modify arbitral awards. 

Scope of the power to modify

The Court emphasised that the power to modify awards is “limited”. Specifically, Indian courts may “modify” arbitral awards only in the following ways.

1. Severability of invalid parts: If a part of an arbitral award—labelled as an “invalid” part of the award—is “severable” from the valid parts (because they are not inter-dependent or intrinsically intertwined), the court may sever the invalid part from the award’s valid parts.
2. Correction of errors: Courts may correct clerical, computational or typographical errors that are apparent on the face of the record.
3. Modification of interest: Courts may modify post-award interest rates where justified (such as a failure to specify interest in the award).

Additionally, the Court noted that under the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court (as opposed to the first instance court hearing the set-aside application) has the power to do “complete justice”, which can include modifying arbitral awards. However, it clarified that this does not extend to rewriting the award or modifying it on the merits.  

The Supreme Court emphasised that a court cannot modify an award if the modification is debatable or if a doubt arises regarding its appropriateness; any modification must be based on error that is clear on the face of the record. Where there is uncertainty, the court should remit the award to the tribunal for reconsideration.

International perspective

The power to modify awards is not novel. 

In England and Wales, legislation expressly confers on courts the power to “vary” awards after an appeal against an award on a point of law succeeds (among other orders that the courts may grant). Variation is also permitted for jurisdictional errors, though the English courts have held that, where a court has the power to vary an award, it would ordinarily be more appropriate to remit the award to the arbitrator, unless the error is “self evident”.

Like in England & Wales, Singapore also permits variation after a successful appeal on a point of law, though, unlike in England & Wales, this power is available only for domestic arbitrations.

Similarly, in the US, a court may “modify” or “correct” an award in statutorily‑prescribed circumstances, where: 

• there is a material miscalculation of figures or a material mistake in the description of a person, thing, or property; 
• the arbitrators ruled on an issue not submitted to them, and correcting this issue would not affect the merits of the award; or 
• the form of award is imperfect and correcting the imperfection would not affect the merits of the dispute.

Why is Gayatri Balasamy novel compared to other jurisdictions?

What sets Gayatri apart is that the Supreme Court’s finding was not anchored in any express statutory provision. The ACA does not explicitly empower courts to modify awards, nor does the UNCITRAL Model Law (the basis for the ACA). Instead, the Supreme Court reasoned that the power to modify is implied, as a subset of the power to set aside.

A key motivation behind this approach was efficiency: the Court recognised the significant time and cost savings if courts could directly modify awards, rather than set them aside entirely, especially given the protracted nature of challenge proceedings in India.

Possible risks and practical uncertainty 

Gayatri may prompt Indian courts to scrutinise the merits of arbitral decisions, encroaching on the finality of arbitration and potentially causing further delays, as alluded to in the dissenting opinion in Gayatri.

The facts of Gayatri highlight this risk. The first-instance court increased the damages awarded by ₹1.68 crore (approx. US$201,600), which was later reduced to ₹50,000 (approx. US$6,000) on appeal. It remains unclear how such modifications align with the Supreme Court’s stated limitations. Notably, the Supreme Court did not comment on the propriety of these factual modifications, as its decision was confined to questions of law.

II. Clarifying the Test for Anti-Suit Injunctions and Addressing State Immunity: The SICC’s Decision in Cooperativa Muratori v. Department of Water Supply & Sewerage Management

In Cooperativa Muratori and Cementisti – CMC di Ravenna, Italy v. Department of Water Supply & Sewerage Management, Kathmandu and another [2025] SGHC(I) 16, the SICC provided important guidance on the test for anti-suit injunctions. The decision serves as a reminder of the affirmative obligations parties face when sovereign immunity is in issue, even if the State or State‑entity does not raise it directly.

The test for anti-suit injunctions

To grant anti-suit injunctions, Singapore courts apply a multi-factorial test from John Reginald Stott Kirkham and others v Trane US Inc and others [2009] 4 SLR(R) 428. However, under the Kirkham test not every factor will be relevant in every case, and no single factor is always determinative. 

In Cooperativa, the SICC clarified that for contractual anti-suit injunctions (i.e., those based on an alleged breach of the arbitration agreement), only three of the five elements of the Kirkham test need to be established.

1. Amenability to jurisdiction: the Defendant must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court where the injunction is sought.
2. Breach of agreement: the foreign proceedings must be in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause or arbitration agreement between the parties.
3. No countervailing reasons: there must be no other strong reasons to decline enforcement of the parties’ agreement. 

The SICC held that other Kirkham factors—such as whether Singapore is the natural forum, whether foreign proceedings would be vexatious or oppressive, and whether the anti-suit injunction would deprive the defendant of legitimate judicial advantages—are typically not relevant to contractual cases. 

Affirmative duty to address sovereign immunity

The ruling is also significant for its comments on sovereign immunity. Under section 3(2) of Singapore’s State Immunity Act 1978, Singapore courts must give effect to State immunity regardless of whether the issue is presented by the parties. 

The SICC held that, because State immunity goes to the court’s jurisdiction, the court has the affirmative duty to consider the issue, and parties have the corresponding responsibility to ensure the issue is addressed, in cases against States or State-owned entities. The duty is more pronounced for ex parte applications (i.e., applications where the other party is not present), but also applies where both parties are present. 

This material is for general information purposes only and is not intended to constitute legal or other advice. The contents of this publication do not constitute any opinion or determination of Indian law by us. Any comments in this publication are based on our experience as international counsel representing our clients in their deals and disputes which may have a connection with India. Freshfields does not practise Indian law and where Indian law advice is needed, we work alongside leading Indian counsel.