EU-UK Competition Cooperation Agreement: What it means for cross-Channel enforcement

The EU and the United Kingdom signed the EU-UK Competition Cooperation Agreement on 25 February 2026 (Agreement), establishing a formal framework for competition enforcement cooperation. The Agreement is subject to approval by the EU institutions and ratification in the UK but, when it comes into force, will mark an evolution in how authorities interact when investigating the same conduct or reviewing the same deals.

From informal channels to formal architecture

Since Brexit, the main legal mechanism for cooperation between the UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and the European Commission has been the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which provides for competition cooperation and coordination in broad terms – but expressly contemplates the subsequent conclusion of a dedicated agreement to supplement those terms. In practice, the TCA's high-level provisions have meant that day-to-day enforcement cooperation has largely operated on an informal, ad hoc basis, without the structured framework that governs the EU's competition relationships with other major jurisdictions. The Agreement formalises and supplements this informal practice, putting in place a clear architecture covering notification, coordination and information-sharing.

For the EU, the Agreement goes further than all of its cooperation agreements in one important respect: it provides for cooperation not just between the CMA and the European Commission (on a day-to-day basis: DG COMP), but also between the CMA and all 27 national competition authorities (NCAs) of the EU Member States. This reflects the decentralised reality of EU competition enforcement, where NCAs handle a significant share of cases under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and often have jurisdiction to review the same merger cases being investigated by the CMA. As the Agreement covers only enforcement of EU competition law, and not the national competition laws of Member States, any investigation by an NCA based on national competition laws, rather than EU competition law, would fall outside the scope of the Agreement.

Parallel enforcement

The practical changes brought about by the Agreement are not particularly significant (given the extent of existing ad hoc cooperation).   But, significantly, the Agreement does clearly signal the increased will of the UK and the EU to coordinate more closely on enforcement activities following a period, immediately post-Brexit, in which they were more inclined to go their own way.

Ultimately, the authorities are setting out an increased will to align their enforcement where they pursue the same or related matters. This (supported by some of the practical mechanisms that the Agreement puts in place or “codifies”) provides the playbook for more synchronised cross-Channel investigations. In practice, this means that the likelihood and extent of “joint” (or at least more heavily coordinated) CMA and European Commission and/or NCA investigations has just gone up. And, for business, this in turn underlines the need for consistent cross-jurisdictional engagement strategies with the CMA and EU competition authorities from the outset.

Of course, coordination is just an option – not an obligation. While the Agreement gives a formal footing to the obligation of each competition authority to notify the other of significant antitrust and merger investigations, notification only has to follow after the first published investigative step has already happened (which is typically later than the authorities would begin working with each other where they cooperate today).  While the Agreement gives a formal footing to the obligation of each competition authority to notify the other of significant antitrust and merger investigations, notification only has to follow the first published investigative step (which in practice is typically later than the point at which authorities already begin cooperating informally). 

The ability to more closely coordinate does not mean outcomes will (necessarily) converge. The Agreement is a cooperation framework, not a harmonisation instrument. While the authorities are subject to the (soft) obligation to “make all reasonable efforts to arrive at an accommodation of each other’s important interests,” they are not compelled to change course, mirroring the approach taken in the EU's long-standing cooperation agreement with the US.

This underlines that – notwithstanding the signal that parallel enforcement is likely to be more joined up than ever – the CMA and EU authorities may still reach different conclusions based on the facts or the law. 

Information sharing: formalised, with safeguards

Since Brexit, companies in dual EU / UK merger or behavioural processes are routinely asked to provide waivers for the CMA to share information with the European Commission and vice versa. The Agreement puts this on a formal standing: it allows competition authorities to exchange confidential information, but only with the written consent of the company providing it. In practice, businesses have found it hard to resist such a request for a waiver – and that will continue. 

Businesses should note the provisions limiting the use of information they provide: information shared between authorities can only be used for competition law enforcement, and only for the proceeding for which it was originally shared (so, for example, information provided by the CMA to the European Commission in a merger case couldn’t be repurposed for an antitrust investigation). Information that could be used to sanction natural persons also triggers additional safeguards, including limitations on using shared information to impose custodial sentences. This is particularly relevant given that the Agreement's scope on the UK side extends to the criminal cartel offence – which carries up to five years' imprisonment – and director disqualification proceedings. Transmitting authorities can also attach bespoke terms and conditions to any information they share – and each authority retains full discretion over what it discloses. 

Next steps

The Agreement is signed but not yet in force. On the EU side, the Council must approve it with the consent of the European Parliament. The UK must complete its own ratification. Both sides' political statements suggest this will proceed without difficulty – but the timeline remains open. A joint review of the Agreement's implementation is foreseen within two years of entry into force.

Outlook

The Agreement is primarily a formalisation of what has been happening informally since 2021 – particularly in relation to information sharing. Its real significance lies in the signal it sends: that the UK, European Commission, and EU Member States are keen to work together more extensively. 

The Agreement underscores the importance for companies to develop coherent, cross-Channel strategies early in an investigation or transaction. With competition authorities on both sides now operating within a formal cooperative framework, businesses will benefit from counsel able to understand the situation “on the ground” in the UK and across the EU, navigate parallel UK-EU processes and anticipate points of alignment or divergence. 

If you would like to discuss this update in more detail, please get in touch with any of the authors or reach out to your Freshfields contact.

This analysis is based on the draft agreement text published in the Commission's proposal for a Council conclusion decision (COM(2025) 233 final). The final signed version has not yet appeared in the Official Journal but is expected to be substantively identical.